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The Islamist regime in Iran is in crisis, ideologically,
economically and politically. A more visible sign of
this crisis manifests itself in the factional conflict be-
tween the ruling conservatives who support an abso-
lutist theocracy, i.e. the supreme rule of the jurispru-
dence (velayat-e faqih), and the reformists who are
after a sort of Islamic pluralism, democracy and rule
of law. But a more subtle and profound dimension of
the present crisis is reflected in the growing disillu-
sionment and frustration among the Iranian youth
and students vented against the conservativeÕs re-
pressive policies. 
Student Movement: 
The Harbinger of
a New Era in Iran
Neither any opposition group, the eight-
year war with Iraq, nor the often-blamed
ÔGreat SatanÕ has dealt as serious a blow to
the authority and legitimacy of the ruling Is-
lamists in Iran as have their own children.
Today, two decades after the 1979 Revolu-
tion that gave power to the ShiÕa clerics in
Iran, the majority of the children born and
raised under the Islamist regime, do not
identify with its ideology and dictated be-
havioural codes. The failure of the Islamic
Republic in its cultural and ideological pro-
jects has recently manifested itself during
two exhibitions of defiance by the youth:
the spontaneous national jubilation over a
game between Iranian and American foot-
ball players in Lyon in June 1998, and the
massive nation-wide student demonstra-
tion against state-run repression in July
1999. 
Students have constituted one of the
most dynamic forces in the recent history of
Iran. They played a major role in the move-
ments that paved the way to the 1979 Revo-
lution and the downfall of the Shah. In the
establishment of the Islamic Republic (IR)
too, a large segment of the student body
played a key role by taking over the Ameri-
can Embassy in 1980 and creating the
Ôhostage crisisÕ. The clerics then effectively
manipulated studentsÕ passion and the
Ôhostage crisisÕ towards their own goals in
the struggle for the state power, eliminating
liberals, seculars and leftists from various or-
gans of power, and eventually consolidat-
ing a theocratic rule. In their ÔCultural Revo-
lutionÕ campaign, the Islamist clerics pitted
Islamist students against other groups and
pursued violent suppression of any student
organization supportive of secular and Is-
lamic dissident trends on various campuses.
They carried out ideological cleansing of
faculty and administration and began
screening student admissions on the basis
of ideological and moral standards as neces-
sary steps towards the ÔIslamizationÕ of uni-
versities. When this campaign met with re-
sistance, the Revolutionary Council issued
an order to close universities for two years
beginning on 5 June 1980.      
The success in suppressing the indepen-
dent student movement and the subse-
quent co-optation of students and universi-
ties that lasted for over 15 years played a
crucial role in the consolidation of the cler-
icsÕ rule. They have been keen on closely
linking traditional religious seminaries and
modern universities, turning for example,
the main quad of the Tehran University
campus into the site of weekly Friday
prayers led by conservative clerics.  
In line with its initial populist nature and
ongoing revolutionary rhetoric, the IR has
promoted mobilization of the youth and
students, especially during the war with
Iraq. But this politicization of the youth, like
that of women, has gradually turned into a
double-edged sword for the conservatives,
who have increasingly lost their influence
on the direction and nature of student ac-
tivism. Many Islamic Associations of Stu-
dents, originally supported and even found-
ed by these clerics, have taken on a life of
their own, becoming real players in the cur-
rent power struggle. One can witness a re-
birth of dissident student movement Ð this
time ironically among the very students
hand-picked by the ruling clerics them-
selves, for example, the two leaders of the
recent student uprising, Tabarzadi and Mo-
h a m m a d i .1
Several factors have contributed to this re-
birth of pro-democracy student activism.
For one, KhatamiÕs election in May 1997 in
which the massive participation and sup-
portive votes of the youth and women
played a crucial role, was a result of the pro-
found change in the political culture of Iran.
StudentsÕ sense of victory about the surpris-
ing results of the presidential elections was
a turning point in the recognition of the sig-
nificance of their own political role. More-
over, a subsequent slow lift of the totalitari-
an hold on the cultural and intellectual do-
mains of society gave rise to new currents of
political and cultural expression among stu-
dents. 
During the past two years, a series of
peaceful student rallies was held around po-
litical and non-political grievances relating
to freedom of press, political prisoners,
housing issues, and quality of food in dormi-
tories. Such protests, however, have been
quickly dispersed or crushed by the police
and vigilantes (Ansar Hezbollah) that are
still under the control of the ruling conserv-
atives. Furthermore, KhatamiÕs reform ef-
forts have been sabotaged and interrupted
by totalitarian Islamists through various
means, including constant pressure on pro-
gressive press, intimidation, terror and the
assassination of a number of prominent op-
position leaders, writers and intellectuals. 
Another turning point resulting in further
erosion of legitimacy and sanctity of the
clerical rule in the eyes of the students was
the violent raid of student hostels by the po-
lice and plain-clothed security forces in July
1999. Instead of punishing the perpetuators
of violence, hundreds of students were ar-
rested and sentenced to long prison terms.
For instance, Ahmad Bateni, the student pic-
tured on the cover of the E c o n o m i s t m a g a-
zine (7-15-99), holding the bloody shirt of
another fellow student, was sentenced to 10
years in prison. Voicing its outrage, the pro-
reform K h o r d a d daily wrote: ÔHolding a
bloody T-shirt is a crime, but making a T-
shirt bloody is not a crime!Õ2
Demographic and social
c h a n g e
To better understand the significance of
the prospective trends in student activism,
it is necessary to account for certain struc-
tural and demographic transformations that
have turned the Iranian society of the late
1990s into one very different from that in-
herited by Khomeini in 1979. Recent drastic
demographic change, due in part to the
pro-natal policy of the state and its rein-
forcement of motherhood as the primary
role of women in the war-stricken years of
1980-1988, has shifted the character of the
population in Iran, the size of which dou-
bled between 1978 and 1996. Over 70% of
IranÕs 65 million people are now below 25
years of age. It is no surprise that the major-
ity of those arrested during the July crack-
down on students were under 20.
Along with demographic changes, there
have been both quantitative and qualitative
changes in the student body. Except for a
brief period of decline in the number of uni-
versity students Ð from 140,000 before the
revolution to 117,148 after the ÔCultural Rev-
olutionÕ (1982-83 academic year) Ð there
was an annual growth rate of 13% for the
1980s and still a higher rate after the war
with Iraq. Prior to KhatamiÕs election there
were 1,150,000 students in universities and
higher education institutions.   
Since the revolution, the ethnic, class, and
gender composition of the student body in
universities has also changed in important
ways. After the 1979 Revolution, the num-
ber of rural and lower class students in state
universities increased tremendously. The
exodus of many upper and upper-middle
class students to universities in foreign
countries, purging of secular students, the
admission policy based on moral and ideo-
logical standards and also admission quotas
for war veteran family members, resulted in
an increase in the proportion of students
from traditional, poorer and provincial
backgrounds in state universities. Ten years
later, the gender composition of the stu-
dents began to change dramatically. In
1999, for the first time in the history of Iran-
ian higher education, the number of female
students in universities surpassed that of
male students by about 20,000 (4%).3 R e-
gardless of their background, these stu-
dents have now come to represent the aspi-
rations and orientations of a new urban
middle class, rather than those of the rural
or the bazaar subcultures. 
ÔThe futureless future-
m a k e r s Õ
The recent shift in the stateÕs population
policy toward family-planning and the suc-
cessful decline in the fertility rate are too
late to address the huge demands of the
new generation of youth for education,
jobs, and leisure. By the late 1990s, facing
increasing unemployment, high inflation,
and bleak economic outlook, many students
lost hope in being able to secure a decent
future. Student activists sarcastically ask the
ruling clerics: ÔWhy are you calling us Òfu-
ture-makersÓ while you have left us with no
future (ayandeh-sazan-e bi-ayandeh) ? Õ
Since KhatamiÕs presidency there has
been a decrease in the intrusion by Islamist
vigilantes into the private lives and personal
choices of the youth and women, and the
dress and behaviour codes have also been
less strictly monitored. Yet, the sense of de-
spair among many youngsters continues.
The recent crackdown has further intensi-
fied insecurity, resentment, and above all
the identity crisis among the youth.4 A n
alarming rate of depression among young
girls in certain parts of Iran, like Qum, has
been documented by official reports.5
The new student movement is still in flux,
inexperienced and loosely organized. So far,
studentsÕ demands for freedom of thought,
of assembly, of press, and of political prison-
ers, as well as their demands for rule of law
and security, have been raised in a voice of
reason and in a non-violent manner. The
predominant discourses among student ac-
tivists are still very similar to those used by
the new reform movement reflective of the
Ônew thinkingÕ among Islamic liberal and
leftist intellectuals as well as within secular
nationalist trends. While one hopes for a
peaceful and constructive evolutionary
process of reform, there is a continuous and
violent interruption in that process by the
retrogressive forces. The lack of profound
improvement in the legal system, civil and
human rights, and economic conditions
could result in a revolutionary explosion, es-
pecially among the increasingly restless and
outraged youth. '
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